End-to-End Encryption




EU-Resolution - Request to the EU-Commission to write a legislative proposal


Draft Council Resolution on Encryption (EU Ministerrat Resolution zur Ende-Zu-Ende Verschlüsselung)


E2EE, encryption prohibition 


The EU resolution is a method of the European Council of Ministers to apply long-term pressure on the European Commission to devote itself to the preparation of a draft law and therefore to initiate an EU regulation or EU directive.
It is intended to fight terrorism in the European Union more effectively by requiring platforms such as WhatsApp and other messenger services to produce a master key for their end-to-end encryption (E2EE) and deposit it with the relevant agencies and authorities.
With this master key, all encryption in communications is opened up, allowing chat histories and other sensitive data to be detected and tracked. This is intended to make investigations into suspected terrorist cases more efficient.
However, a review of recent, tragic terrorist incidents has shown that insufficient access in digital form has not prevented the authorities from working effectively against terrorism. Rather, the failure of official processes has been responsible in some places.


1. Implied general suspicion for all citizens
The resulting communication surveillance of all persons that exchange and store private data via Messenger and other forms of digital media with end-to-end encryption automatically creates an indirect general suspicion of terrorism for every citizen of the EU member states.
2. Hackers are lured by security holes
Master keys are not only a way for authorities to take a wide view of our data. It creates a gap in the security system that cyber criminals like hackers and similar can find and exploit to break into our systems. The given surveillance capability, which was intended to protect against terrorism, therefore limits our protection against criminal activities such as cyber attacks and massively increases the risk of publication of our private data. Also the danger from foreign, negative-minded secret services with professional structure & given modernity increases immeasurably by the creation of these security gaps.
3. Censorship and persecution of political opponents
To date, it has not been defined which authorities should be responsible in the event that the EU resolution should be transformed into applicable law by an EU regulation. A form of separation of powers within the control processes is not planned. The misuse of general keys to monitor political, private communication is therefore not excluded, so that political opponents with unwanted opinions, which can occur in private chats, could be identified and silenced. Here a critical view towards Hungary.
4. Destruction of the general data protection regulation
Only recently, the GDPR was established to ensure the protection of all our data. Now we are working against exactly this basic principle. A cloud of surveillance is constantly hovering over all our private data. This is an ironic development, considering that the European Court of Justice has only recently been working to protect our privacy and data.

Current status

Currently the EU resolution is almost completely drafted. Minor changes may still occur after the meeting of some working groups on 19.11.2020 and 25.11.2020. However, the resolution will in all probability hardly be revised at all, so that adoption is already planned and assumed for early December.


Softening encryption weakens overall IT security" – Susanne Dehmel, 2020
Experience shows that backdoors of any kind are abused sooner or later“ – Ulrich Kelber, 2020


Moechel (2020): „Auf den Terorranschlag folgt EU-Verschlüsselungsverbot“, radio FM4, 08.11.2020 (November 2020)

Feld & Kliss (2020): „Eine Hintertür für die Ermittler?“, Tagesschau, 13.11.2020 (November 2020)

Witte (2020): „Ende-zu-Ende-Verschlüsselung – was genau ist das?“, heise online, 23.06.2020 (November 2020)

Link (2020): „Ende-zu-Ende-Verschlüsselung: EU will im Eilverfahren Generalschlüssel für die Behorden“, PCGH, 11.11.2020 (November 2020)

Wölken (2020). Twitter, 09.11.2020 (November 2020)

Dehmel, Krösmann, Artz (2020): „Bitkom kritisiert geplante Hintertüren in Kommunikationsdiensten“, bitkom, 10.11.2020 (November 2020)